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Choice revision
Li Zhang
Abstract. Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision,
in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a
set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based
on a new approach to belief change called descriptor revision. We prove
that each of two variants of choice revision based on such construction is
axiomatically characterized with a set of plausible postulates, assuming
that the object language is finite. Furthermore, we introduce an alterna-
tive modelling for choice revision, which is based on a type of relation on
sets of sentences, named multiple believability relation. We show without
assuming a finite language that choice revision constructed from such re-
lations is axiomatically characterized with the same sets of postulates
proposed for the choice revision based on descriptor revision, whenever
the relations satisfy certain rationality conditions.
Keywords: choice revision, non-prioritized multiple belief revision, be-
lief change, descriptor revision, multiple believability relation
1 Introduction
Belief change1 theory studies how a rational agent changes her belief state when
she is exposed to new information. Studies in this field have traditionally had a
strong focus on two types of change: contraction in which a specified sentence
has to be removed from the original belief state, and revision in which a specified
sentence has instead to be consistently added. This paper is mainly concerned
with the latter.
Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (AGM) performed the pioneering for-
mal study on these two types of change in their seminal paper [1]. In the AGM
theory of belief change, the agent’s belief state is represented by a set of sentences
from some formal language L, usually denoted by K. The new information is
represented by a single sentence in L. Belief revision and contraction on K are
formally represented by two operations ∗ and ÷, mapping from a sentence ϕ to a
new set of sentences K∗ϕ and K÷ϕ respectively. [1] postulated some conditions
that a rational revision or contraction operation should satisfy, which are called
AGM postulates on revision and contraction.
Furthermore, [1] showed that contraction and revision satisfying AGM postu-
lates could be precisely constructed from a model based on partial meet functions
on remainder sets. After that, many alternative models [3,10,9,11, etc.] have been
proposed to construct the contraction and revision operations satisfying AGM
1 In some literature, the term “belief revision” is used as a synonym for belief change.
In what follows, we use belief revision to refer to a particular kind of belief change.
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postulates. Although these models look entirely different on the surface, most
of them employ the same select-and-intersect strategy [14, p. 19]. For example,
in partial meet construction for contraction [1], a selection is made among re-
mainders and in sphere modelling for revision [10], a selection is made among
possible worlds. The intersection of the selected objects is taken as the outcome
of the operation in both cases.
Although the AGM theory has virtually become a standard model of theory
change, many researchers are unsatisfied with its settings in several aspects and
have proposed several modifications and generalizations to that framework (see
[6] for a survey). Here we only point out two inadequatenesses of the AGM
theory.
On the one hand, in the original AGM model, the input is represented by
a single sentence. This is unrealistic since agents often receive more than one
piece of information at the same time. In order to cover these cases, we can
generalize sentential revision to multiple revision, where the input is a finite or
infinite set of sentences. On the other hand, in AGM revision, new information
has priority over original beliefs. This is represented by the success postulate:
ϕ ∈K ∗ϕ for all ϕ. The priority means that the new information will always be
entirely incorporated, whereas previous beliefs will be discarded whenever the
agent need do so in order to incorporate the new information consistently. This
is a limitation of AGM theory since in real life it is a common phenomenon that
agents do not accept the new information that they receive or only accept it
partially. As a modification, we can drop the success postulate and generalize
prioritized revision to non-prioritized belief revision.
In this contribution, we will put these two generalizations together and con-
sider the so called multiple non-prioritized belief revision. In [4], two different
kinds of such generalized revision are distinguished:
1. Merge: K and A are symmetrically treated, i.e., sentences of K and A could
be accepted or rejected.
2. Choice revision2: some sentences of A could be accepted, some others could
be rejected.
We use ∗c to denote a choice revision operation. [4] investigated the formal
properties of merge but left the study on choice revision as future work. As far
as we know, little work has been done on this kind of revision in the literature.
This fact can be partly explained by that the operation ∗c has the unusual
2 Here we use the term “choice revision”, introduced by [7], to replace the
term“selective change” used in [4], for it is easier for us to distinguish it from the
“selective revision” introduced in [5], which is a sort of non-prioritized revision with
a single sentence as input. It should be noted that generally choice revision by a
finite set A cannot be reduced to selective revision by the conjunction &A of all
elements in A. To see this, let ∗s be some selective revision. It is assumed that ∗s
satisfies extensionality, i.e. if ϕ is logically equivalent to ψ, then K ∗sϕ =K ∗sψ. So,
K ∗′ &{ϕ,¬ϕ} = K ∗′ &{ψ,¬ψ} for all ϕ and ψ. However, it is clearly unreasonable
for choice revision ∗c that K ∗c {ϕ,¬ϕ} =K ∗c {ψ,¬ψ} should hold for all ϕ and ψ.
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characteristic that the standard select-and-intersect approach is not in general
applicable. To see why, let the set K of original beliefs not contain any element
of A = {ϕ,¬ϕ}. We are going to construct a set K ∗c A which incorporates
ϕ or its negation. Suppose that we do that by first selecting a collection X =
{X1,X2,X3,⋯} of sets of beliefs, each of which satisfies the success condition
for choice revision with A, i.e. Xi ∩A ≠ ∅ for each Xi. Then it may be the case
that ϕ ∈ X1 and ¬ϕ ∈ X2. Given that X1 and X2 are consistent, it follows that
the intersection ∩X cannot satisfy the success condition, i.e. it contains neither
ϕ or ¬ϕ.
Therefore, to develop a modelling for choice revision, we need to choose
another strategy than the select-and-intersect method. [12] introduced a new
approach of belief change named “descriptor revision”, which employs a “select-
direct” methodology: It assumes that there is a set of belief sets as potential
outcomes of belief change, and the belief change is performed by a direct choice
among these potential outcomes. Furthermore, this is a very powerful frame-
work for constructing belief change operations since success conditions for var-
ious types of belief changes are described in a general way with the help of a
metalinguistic belief operator B. For instance, the success condition of con-
traction by ϕ is ¬Bϕ, that of revision by ϕ is Bϕ. Descriptor revision on
a belief set K is performed with a unified operator ○ which applies to any
success condition that is expressible with B. Hence, choice revision ∗c with
a finite input set can be constructed from descriptor revision in the way of
K ∗c {ϕ1, ϕ2,⋯, ϕn} =K ○ {Bϕ1 ∨Bϕ2 ∨⋯∨Bϕn} [14, p. 130].
Although the construction of choice revision in the framework of descriptor
revision has been introduced in [14], the formal properties of this type of belief
change are still in need of investigation. The main purpose of this contribution
is to conduct such an investigation. After providing some formal preliminaries
in Section 2, we will review how to construct choice revision in the framework of
descriptor revision in Section 3. More importantly, in this section, we will inves-
tigate the postulates on choice revision which could axiomatically characterize
these constructions. In Section 4 we will propose an alternative modelling for
choice revision, which is based on multiple believability relations, a generalized
version of believability relation introduced in [13] and further studied in [18]. We
will investigate the formal properties of this modelling and prove the associated
representation theorems. Section 5 concludes and indicates some directions for
future work. All proofs of the formal results are placed in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
The object language L is defined inductively by a set v of propositional variables
{p0, p1, ⋯, pn, ⋯} and the truth-functional operations ¬,∧,∨ and → in the usual
way. ⊺ is a tautology and ⊥ a contradiction. L is called finite if v is finite. Sentences
in L will be denoted by lower-case Greek letters and sets of such sentences by
upper-case Roman letters.
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Cn is a consequence operation for L satisfying supraclassicality (if ϕ can be
derived from A by classical truth-functional logic, then ϕ ∈ Cn(A)), compactness
(if ϕ ∈ Cn(A), then there exists some finite B ⊆ A such that ϕ ∈ Cn(B)) and
the deduction property (ϕ ∈ Cn(A ∪ {ψ}) if and only if ψ → ϕ ∈ Cn(A)). X ⊢ ϕ
and X ⊬ ϕ are alternative notations for ϕ ∈ Cn(X) and ϕ ∉ Cn(X) respectively.
{ϕ} ⊢ ψ is rewritten as ϕ ⊢ ψ for simplicity. And ϕ ⊣⊩ ψ means ϕ ⊢ ψ and
ψ ⊢ ϕ. A ≡ B holds iff for every ϕ ∈ A, there exists some ψ ∈ B such that ϕ ⊣⊩ ψ
and vice versa.
For all finite A, let &A denote the conjunction of all elements in A. For any A
and B, A?B = {ϕ∧ψ ∣ ϕ ∈ A and ψ ∈ B}. We write ϕ?ψ and A0?A1 ?⋯?An
instead of {ϕ}? {ψ} and (⋯(A0 ?A1)?⋯)?An for simplicity.
The set of beliefs an agent holds is represented by a belief set, which is a set
X ⊆ L such that X = Cn(X). K is fixed to denote the original beliefs of the
agent. We assume that K is consistent unless stated otherwise.
3 Choice revision based on descriptor revision
Before investigating the properties of choice revision constructed in the frame-
work of descriptor revision, we first present some formal basics of this framework,
which is mainly based on [12].
3.1 Basics of descriptor revision
An atomic belief descriptor is a sentence Bϕ with ϕ ∈ L. Note that the sym-
bol B is not part of the object language L. A molecular belief descriptor is
a truth-functional combination of atomic descriptors. A composite belief de-
scriptor (henceforth: descriptor; denoted by upper-case Greek letters) is a set of
molecular descriptors.
Bϕ is satisfied by a belief set X , if and only if ϕ ∈ X . Conditions of satis-
faction for molecular descriptors are defined inductively, hence, provided that ϕ
and ψ stand for molecular descriptors, X satisfies ¬ϕ if and only if it does not
satisfy ϕ, it satisfies ϕ∧ψ if and only if it satisfies both ϕ and ψ, etc. It satisfies
a composite descriptor Φ if and only if it satisfies all its elements. X ⊩ Φ denotes
that set X satisfies descriptor Φ.
Descriptor revision on a belief set K is performed with a unified operator ○
such that K ○ Φ is an operation with Φ as its success condition. [12] introduces
several constructions for descriptor revision operations, of which the relational
model defined as follows has a canonical status.
Definition 1 ([12]) (X,≦) is a relational select-direct model (in short: rela-
tional model) with respect to K if and only if it satisfies:3
(X1) X is a set of belief sets.
3 We will drop the phrase “with respect to K” if this does not affect the understand-
ing, and write Xϕ and Xϕ< instead of X
{Bϕ} and X{Bϕ}< for simplicity.
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(X2) K ∈ X.
(≦ 1) K ≦X for every X ∈ X.
(≦ 2) For any Φ, if {X ∈ X ∣X ⊩ Φ} (we denote it as XΦ) is not empty, then
it has a unique ≦-minimal element denoted by XΦ< .
A descriptor revision ○ on K is based on (or determined by) some relational
model (X,≦) with respect to K if and only if for any Φ,
⟨≦ to ○⟩4 K ○Φ =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
X
Φ
< if X
Φ is not empty,
K otherwise.
X could be seen as an outcome set which includes all the potential outcomes
under various belief change patterns. The ordering ≦ (with the strict part <)
brings out a direct-selection mechanism, which selects the final outcome among
candidates satisfying a specific success condition. Given condition (≦ 2), this
sort of selection is achievable for any success condition satisfiable in X. We call
descriptor revision constructed in this way relational descriptor revision.
As [18] pointed out, in so far as the selection mechanism is concerned, de-
scriptor revision is at a more abstract level comparing with the AGM revision.
In the construction of descriptor revision ○, “it assumes that there exists an
outcome set which contains all the potential outcomes of the operation ○, but
it says little about what these outcomes should be like” [18, p. 41]. In contrast,
in the AGM framework, the belief change is supposed to satisfy the principle
of consistency preservation and the principle of the informational economy [8].
Therefore, the intersection step in the construction of belief change in the AGM
framework becomes dispensable in the context of descriptor revision. This may
explain why the descriptor revision model could be a select-direct approach.
3.2 Choice revision constructed from descriptor revision
The success condition for choice revision ∗c with a finite input could be easily
expressed by descriptor {Bϕ0 ∨⋯∨Bϕn}. So, it is straightforward to construct
choice revision through descriptor revision as follows.
Definition 2 ([14]) Let ○ be some descriptor revision. A choice revision ∗c on
K is based on (or determined by) ○ if and only if for any finite set A,
⟨○ to ∗c⟩ K ∗c A =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
K ○ {Bϕ0 ∨⋯∨Bϕn} if A = {ϕ0,⋯, ϕn} ≠ ∅,
K otherwise.
Henceforth, we say ∗c is based on (or determined by) some relational model
if it is based on the descriptor revision determined by the same model. The main
purpose of this section is to investigate the formal properties of choice revision
based on such models.
4 Provided that (X,≦) is a relational model, X is equivalent to the domain of ≦ since
K ∈ X and K ≦X for all X ∈ X. So ≦ in itself can represent the (X,≦) faithfully.
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3.3 Postulates and representation theorem
It is observed that the choice revision determined by relational models should
satisfy a set of arguably plausible postulates on choice revision.
Observation 1 Let ∗c be a choice revision determined by any relational de-
scriptor revision (X,≦). Then it satisfies the following postulates:
(∗c1) Cn(K ∗c A) =K ∗c A. (∗c-closure)
(∗c2) K ∗c A =K or A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅. (∗c-relative success)
(∗c3) If A ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅. (∗c-regularity)
(∗c4) If A ∩K ≠ ∅, then K ∗c A =K. (∗c-confirmation)
(∗c5) If (K ∗c A) ∩ B ≠ ∅ and (K ∗c B) ∩ A ≠ ∅, then K ∗c A = K ∗c B.
(∗c-reciprocity)
Moreover, another plausible condition on choice revision follows from this set
of postulates.
Observation 2 If ∗c satisfies ∗c-closure, relative success, regularity and reci-
procity, then ∗c satisfies:
If A ≡ B, then K ∗c A =K ∗c B. (∗c-syntax irrelevance)
It is easy to see that the postulates in above are natural generalizations of
the following postulates on sentential revision:
(∗1) Cn(K ∗ ϕ) =K ∗ϕ (∗-closure)
(∗2) If K ∗ ϕ ≠K, then ϕ ∈K ∗ ϕ (∗-relative success)
(∗3) If ϕ ∈K, then K ∗ϕ =K (∗-confirmation)
(∗4) If ψ ∈K ∗ϕ, then ψ ∈K ∗ ψ (∗-regularity)
(∗5) If ψ ∈K ∗ϕ and ϕ ∈K ∗ψ, then K ∗ ϕ =K ∗ ψ (∗-reciprocity)5
and
If ϕ ⊣⊩ ψ, then K ∗ϕ =K ∗ψ. 6 (∗-extensionality)
The above postulates on choice revision are as intuitively plausible as their
correspondents on sentential revision, except that the meaning of ∗c-reciprocity
seems not so transparent as that of ∗-reciprocity. However, given some weak
conditions, we can show that the ∗c-reciprocity postulate is equivalent to a more
understandable condition as follows.
Observation 3 Let choice operation ∗c satisfy ∗c-relative success and
∗c-regularity. Then it satisfies ∗c-reciprocity iff it satisfies:
If A ⊆ B and (K ∗c B) ∩A ≠ ∅, then K ∗c A =K ∗c B. (∗c-cautiousness)
5 This postulate is first discussed in [2] in the context of maxichoice revision.
6 It is easy to check that ∗-extensionality is derivable from (∗1), (∗2), (∗3) and (∗5).
The postulate ∗c-cautiousness reflects a distinctive characteristic of choice revi-
sion modelled by relational models: The agent who performs this sort of belief
change is cautious in the sense of only adding the smallest possible part of the
new information to her original beliefs. It follows immediately from ∗c-relative
success and ∗c-cautiousness that if A∩(K ∗cA) ≠ ∅, then K ∗cA =K ∗c {ϕ} for
some ϕ ∈ A. Thus, it is not surprising that the following postulate follows.
Observation 4 If ∗c satisfies ∗c-relative success, regularity and reciprocity, then
∗c satisfies:
K ∗c (A ∪B) =K ∗c A or K ∗c (A ∪B) =K ∗c B. (∗c-dichotomy)
In contrast to (∗c1) through (∗c5), postulates ∗c-cautiousness and ∗c-dichotomy
do not have directly corresponding postulates in the context of sentential revi-
sion. This suggests that though (∗c1) through (∗c5) naturally generalize (∗1)
through (∗5), this sort of generalization is not so trivial as we may think of. As
another evidence for this, the following observation shows that the properties of
(∗1) through (∗5) and those of their generalizations are not always paralleled.
Observation 5 Let ∗c satisfy ∗c-regularity. Then it satisfies ∗c-reciprocity iff
it satisfies
For any n ≥ 1, if (K∗cA1)∩A0 ≠ ∅, ⋯, (K∗cAn)∩An−1 ≠ ∅, (K∗cA0)∩An ≠
∅, then K ∗c A0 =K ∗c A1 = ⋯ =K ∗c An. (∗c-strong reciprocity)
∗-strong reciprocity is a generalization of the following postulate on sentential
revision:
For any n ≥ 1, if ϕ0 ∈ K ⋆ ϕ1, ⋯, ϕn−1 ∈ K ∗ ϕn and ϕn ∈ K ⋆ ϕ0, then
K ⋆ ϕ0 =K ⋆ ϕ2 = ⋯ =K ⋆ ϕn. (∗-strong reciprocity )7
However, in contrast to the result in Observation 5, ∗-strong reciprocity is not
derivable from (∗1) through (∗5).8
After an investigation on the postulates (∗c1) through (∗c5) satisfied by
choice revision based on rational models, the question raises naturally whether
the choice revision could be axiomatically characterized by this set of postulates.
We get a partial answer to this question: a representation theorem is obtainable
when L is finite.
Theorem 1 Let L be a finite language. Then, ∗c satisfies (∗c1) through (∗c5)
iff it is a choice revision based on some relational model.
7 ∗-strong reciprocity is closely related to a non-monotonic reasoning rule named
“loop” which is first introduced in [16]. For more discussion on this, see [17].
8 To see this, let K = Cn({⊺}) and revision operation ∗ on K defined as: (i) if
p0∧p1 ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⊢ p0, then K ∗ϕ = Cn({p0 ∧ p1}); (ii) if p1∧p2 ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⊢ p1, then
K ∗ ϕ = Cn({p1 ∧ p2}); (iii) if p0 ∧ p2 ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⊢ p2, then K ∗ ϕ = Cn({p0 ∧ p2});
(iv) otherwise, K ∗ ϕ = Cn({ϕ}). It is easy to check that ∗ satisfies (∗1) through
(∗5) but not ∗-strong reciprocity.
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3.4 More properties of choice revision
In this subsection, we will study additional properties of choice revision from
the point of view of postulates. The postulates introduced in the previous sub-
section do not necessarily cover all the reasonable properties of this operation.
In what follows we are going to investigate some additional ones, in particular,
the following:
If A ≠ ∅, thenA ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅. (∗c-success)
If A /≡ {⊥}, then K ∗c A ⊬ ⊥. (∗c-consistency)
To some extent, ∗c-success is a strengthening of ∗c-relative success and ∗c-
regularity, but it does not say anything about the limiting case in which the
input is empty. To cover this limiting case, we need the following postulate:
If A = ∅, then K ∗c A =K. (∗c-vacuity)
The interrelations among ∗c-success, ∗c-relative success and
∗c-regularity are summarized as follows.
Observation 6 Let ∗c be some choice revision on K.
1. If ∗c satisfies relative success, then it satisfies vacuity.
2. If ∗c satisfies success and vacuity, then it satisfies relative success.
3. If ∗c satisfies success, then it satisfies regularity.
∗c-consistency is a plausible constraint on a rational agent. While accepting
∗c-success and ∗c-consistency as “supplementary” postulates for choice revision
∗c, the corresponding relational model on which ∗c is based will also need to
satisfy some additional properties. We use the following representation theorem
to conclude this subsection.
Theorem 2 Let L be a finite language and ∗c some revision operation on K ⊆
L. Then, ∗c satisfies ∗c-closure, ∗c- success, ∗c-vacuity, ∗c-confirmation, ∗c-
reciprocity and ∗c-consistency iff it is a choice revision determined by some re-
lational model which satisfies the following two condition:
(X3) Cn({⊥}) ∈ X;
(≦ 3) XBϕ ≠ ∅ and XBϕ< < Cn({⊥}) for every ϕ /⊢ ⊥.
4 An alternative modelling for choice revision
In this section, we propose an alternative modelling for choice revision, which
is based on so-called multiple believability relations. A believability relation ⪯ is
a binary relation on sentences of L. Intuitively, ϕ ⪯ ψ means that the subject
is at least as prone to believing ϕ as to believing ψ.9 We can generalize ⪯ to a
multiple believability relation ⪯∗ which is a binary relation on the set of all finite
subsets of L satisfying:
9 For more detailed investigation on believability relations, including its relationship
with the epistemic entrenchment relation introduced in [9], see [13] and [18].
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⟨⪯∗ to ⪯⟩ ϕ ⪯ ψ iff {ϕ} ⪯∗ {ψ}.
This kind of generalization can be done in different ways, and at least two dis-
tinct relations can be obtained, namely package multiple believability relations,
denoted by ⪯p, and choice multiple believability relations, denoted by ⪯c (with
symmetric part ≃c and strict part ≺c). Intuitively, A ⪯p B means that it is easier
for the subject to believe all propositions in A than to believe all propositions in
B and A ⪯c B means that it is easier for the subject to believe some proposition
in A than to believe some proposition in B.
⪯p is of little interest since A ⪯p B can be immediately reduced to &A ⪯ &B,
given that A and B are finite. In what follows, multiple believability relations (or
multi-believability relations for short) only refer to choice multiple believability
relations ⪯c. ({ϕ} ⪯c A will be written as ϕ ⪯c A for simplicity.)
4.1 Postulates on multi-believability relations
Recall the following postulates on believability relations ⪯ introduced in [18]:
⪯-transitivity : If ϕ ⪯ ψ and ψ ⪯ λ, then ϕ ⪯ λ.
⪯-weak coupling : If ϕ ≃ ϕ ∧ψ and ϕ ≃ ϕ ∧ λ, then ϕ ≃ ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ λ).
⪯-coupling : If ϕ ≃ ψ, then ϕ ≃ ϕ ∧ ψ.
⪯-counter dominance: If ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ψ ⪯ ϕ.
⪯-minimality : ϕ ∈K if and only if ϕ ⪯ ψ for all ψ.
⪯-maximality : If ψ ⪯ ϕ for all ψ, then ϕ ≡ ⊥.
⪯-completeness: ϕ ⪯ ψ or ψ ⪯ ϕ
Transitivity is assumed for almost all orderings. In virtue of the intuitive
meaning of believability relation, ϕ ≃ ϕ∧ψ represents that the agent will accept
ψ in the condition of accepting ϕ. Thus, the rationale for ⪯-weak coupling is
that if the agent will consequently add ψ and λ to her beliefs when accepting
ϕ, then she also adds the conjunction of them to her beliefs in this case. This
is reasonable if we assume that the beliefs of the agent are closed under the
consequence operation. The justification of ⪯-counter dominance is that if ϕ
logically entails ψ, then it will be a smaller change and hence easier for the
agent to accept ψ rather than to accept ϕ, because then ψ must be added too, if
we assume that the beliefs of the agent are represented by a belief set. ⪯-coupling
is a strengthening of ⪯-weak coupling.10 It says that if ϕ is equivalent to ψ in
believability, then the agent will consequently add ψ to her beliefs in case of
accepting ϕ and vice versa. ⪯c-minimality is justifiable since nothing needs to
be done to add ϕ to K if it is already in K. ⪯-maximality is justifiable since it
is reasonable to assume that it is strictly more difficult for a rational agent to
accept ⊥ than to accept any non-falsum. ⪯-completeness seems a little bit strong.
It says that all pairs of sentences are comparable in believability. In accordance
10 It is easy to see that ⪯-coupling implies ⪯-weak coupling, provided that ⪯-transitivity
and ⪯-counter dominance hold.
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with [18], we call relations satisfying all these postulates quasi-linear believability
relations.
We can generalize these postulates on believability relations in a natural way
to postulates multi-believability relations as follows:11
⪯c-transitivity : If A ⪯c B and B ⪯c C, then A ⪯c C.
⪯c-weak coupling : If A ≃c A?B and A ≃c A?C, then A ≃c A?B ?C.
⪯c-coupling : If A ≃c B, then A ≃c A?B.
⪯c-counter dominance: If for every ϕ ∈ B there exists ψ ∈ A such that
ϕ ⊢ ψ, then A ⪯c B.
⪯c-minimality : A ⪯c B for all B if and only if A ∩K ≠ ∅.
⪯c-maximality : If B is not empty and A ⪯c B for all non-empty A, then
B ≡ {⊥}.
⪯c-completeness: A ⪯c B or B ⪯c A.
These postulates on multi-believability relations can be understood in a similar
way that their correspondents on believability relations are understood.
Furthermore, we propose the following two additional postulates on multi-
believability relations:
⪯c-determination : A ≺c ∅ for every non-empty A.
⪯c-union : A ⪯ A ∪B or B ⪯ A ∪B.
At least on the surface, these two could not be generalizations of any postulate on
believability relation. In some sense the meaning of
⪯c-determination is correspondent to that of ∗c-success, since if it is a
strictly smaller change for the agent to accept some sentences from a non-empty
A rather than to take some sentences from the empty set, which is obviously
impossible, then it seems to follow that the agent will successfully add some
sentences in A to her original beliefs when exposed to the new information rep-
resented by A, and vice versa. Similarly, there is an obvious correspondence
between the forms and meanings of ⪯c-union and ∗c-dichotomy. They both sug-
gest that to partially accept a non-empty A is equivalent to accept some single
sentence in A. This is plausible if we assume that the agent is extremely cautious
to the new information.
Observation 7 Let ⪯c be some multi-believability relation satisfying ⪯c-transitivity
and ⪯c-counter dominance. If it satisfies ⪯c-union in addition, then
1. It satisfies ⪯c-completeness.
2. It satisfies ⪯c-weak coupling iff it ⪯c-satisfies coupling.
Observation 7 indicates that ⪯c-union is strong. It should be noted that for a
believability relation, neither ⪯-completeness nor ⪯-coupling can be derived from
⪯-transitivity, ⪯-counter dominance and ⪯-weak coupling.
In what follows, we name multi-believability relations satisfying all the above
postulates standard multi-believability relations.
11 In what follows, it is always assumed that all sets A and B and C mentioned in
postulates on multi-believability relations are finite sets.
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4.2 Translations between believability relations and multiple
believability relations
In this subsection, we will show that although it is impossible to find a postu-
late on believability relations that corresponds to ⪯c-determination or ⪯c-union,
there exists a translation between quasi-linear believability relations and stan-
dard multi-believability relations.
Observation 8 Let ⪯c satisfy ⪯c-determination, ⪯c-transitivity and ⪯c-counter
dominance. Then, for any non-empty finite sets A and B,
1. A ⪯c B if and only if there exists ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯c B.
2. A ⪯c B if and only if A ⪯c ϕ for all ϕ ∈ B.
This observation suggests that ⪯ and ⪯c can be linked through the following two
transitions:
⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩ ϕ ⪯ ψ iff {ϕ} ⪯c {ψ}.
⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ A ⪯c B iff B = ∅ or there exists ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯ ψ for every
ψ ∈ B.
This is confirmed by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 1. If ⪯ is a quasi-linear believability relation and ⪯c is constructed
from ⪯ through the way of ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩, then ⪯c is a standard multi-believability
relation and ⪯ can be retrieved from ⪯c in the way of ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩.
2. If ⪯c is a standard multi-believability relation and ⪯ is constructed from ⪯c
through ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩, then ⪯ is a quasi-linear believability relation and ⪯c can
be retrieved from ⪯ through ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩.
4.3 Choice revision constructed from multi-believability relations
Now we turn to the construction of choice revision through
multi-believability relations. Recall that a sentential revision ∗ can be con-
structed from a believability relation ⪯ in this way [18]:
⟨⪯ to ∗⟩ K ∗ ϕ = {ψ ∣ ϕ ≃ ϕ ∧ ψ}
As we have explained, ϕ ≃ ϕ ∧ ψ could be understood as that the agent will
consequently accept ψ in case of accepting ϕ. So, the set {ψ ∣ ϕ ≃ ϕ ∧ψ} is just
the agent’s new set of beliefs after she performed belief revision with input ϕ.
Thus, we can similarly construct choice revision from multi-believability relations
in the following way:
Definition 3 Let ⪯c be some multi-believability relation. A choice revision ∗c
on K is based on (or determined by) ⪯c if and only if: for any finite A,
⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩ K ∗c A =
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ} If A ≺c ∅,
K otherwise.
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The primary results of this section are the following two representation the-
orems. Comparing with Theorems 1 and 2, these two theorems are applicable
to more general cases since they do not assume that the language L is finite.
These two theorems demonstrate that multi-believability relations provide a fair
modelling for choice revision characterized by the set of postulates mentioned in
Section 3.
Theorem 4 Let ∗c be some choice revision on K. Then, ∗c satisfies (∗c1)
through (∗c5) iff it is determined by some multi-believability relation ⪯c sat-
isfying ⪯c-transitivity, ⪯c-weak coupling, ⪯c-counter-dominance, ⪯c-minimality
and ⪯c-union.
Theorem 5 Let ∗c be some choice revision on K. Then, ∗c satisfies ∗c-closure,
∗c- success, ∗c-vacuity, ∗c-confirmation, ∗c-reciprocity and ∗c-consistency iff it
is determined by some standard multi-believability relation.
Considering the translation between multi-believability relations and believ-
ability relations (Theorem 3), it seems that these results can be easily transferred
to the context of believability relations. However, if we drop some postulates on
multi-believability relation such as ⪯c-determination, the translation between
multi-believability relation and believability relation will not be so transpar-
ent, at least it will not be so straightforward as ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ and ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩. As a
consequence, the result in Theorem 4 may not be possible to transfer to believ-
ability relations in a straightforward way. Moreover, comparing with postulates
on believability relations, postulates on multi-believability relations such as ⪯c-
determination and ⪯c-union can present our intuitions on choice revision in a
more direct way. Thus, the multi-believability relation is still worth to be stud-
ied in its own right.
5 Conclusion and future work
As a generalization of traditional belief revision, choice revision has more real-
istic characteristics. The new information is represented by a set of sentences
and the agent could partially accept these sentences as well as reject the others.
From the point of technical view, choice revision is interesting since the stan-
dard “select-and-intersect” methodology in modellings for belief change is not
suitable for it. But instead, it can be modelled by a newly developed framework
of descriptor revision, which employs a “select-direct” approach. After review-
ing the construction of choice revision in the framework of descriptor revision,
under the assumption that the language is finite, we provided two sets of postu-
lates as the axiomatic characterizations for two variants of choice revision based
on such constructions (in Theorem 1 and 2). These postulates, in particular,
∗c-cautiousness and ∗c-dichotomy, point out that choice revision modelled by
descriptor revision has the special characteristic that the agent who performs
this sort of belief change is cautious in the sense that she only accepts the new
information to the smallest possible extent.
12
For AGM revision and contraction, there are various independently moti-
vated modellings which are equivalent in terms of expressive power. In this
contribution, we also propose an alternative modelling for choice revision. We
showed that multi-believability relations can also construct the choice revision
axiomatically characterized by the sets of postulates proposed for choice revi-
sion based on descriptor revision (Theorem 4 and 5). Moreover, these results
are obtainable without assuming that the language is finite. This may indicate
that multi-believability relations are an even more suitable modelling for choice
revision.
The study in this contribution can be developed in at least three directions.
First, the cautiousness constraint on choice revision, reflected by ∗c-cautiousness,
certainly could be loosened. We think it is an interesting topic for future work
to investigate the modeling and axiomatic characterization of more “reckless”
variants of choice revision. Secondly, as it was showed in [18] that AGM revision
could be reconstructed from believability relations satisfying certain conditions,
it is interesting to ask which conditions a multi-believability relation should sat-
isfy so that its generated choice revision coincides with an AGM revision when
the inputs are limited to singletons. Finally, it is technically interesting to investi-
gate choice revisions with an infinite input set, though they are epistemologically
unrealistic.
Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 Let ⪯c be some multiple believability relation which satisfies
⪯c-counter dominance and ⪯c-transitivity. Then,
1. If ⪯c satisfies ⪯c-union, then for every non-empty A, there exists some ϕ ∈ A
such that ϕ ≃c A.
2. For every ϕ ∈ A, A ≃c A? ϕ if and only if ϕ ≃c A.
Proof (Proof for Lemma 1:). 1. We prove this by mathematical induction on the
size n (n ≥ 1) of A. Let n = 1, then it follows immediately. Suppose hypothetically
that it holds for n = k (k ≥ 1). Let n = k + 1. Since k ≥ 1, there exists a non-
empty set B containing k elements and a sentence ϕ such that A = B ∪ {ϕ}. By
⪯c-counter dominance and ⪯c-union, (i) A ≃c {ϕ} or (ii) A ≃c B. The case of (i)
is trivial. In the case of (ii), by the hypothetical supposition, there exists some
ψ ∈ B ⊆ A such that A ≃c B ≃c ψ. So, by ⪯c-transitivity, A ≃c ϕ. To sum up (i)
and (ii), there always exists some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ≃c A.
2. From left to right: Let ϕ ∈ A and A?ϕ ≃c A. By ⪯c-counter dominance, A ⪯c ϕ
and ϕ ⪯c A ? ϕ. And it follows from ϕ ⪯c A? ϕ and A ? ϕ ≃c A that ϕ ⪯c A
by ⪯c-transitivity. Thus, ϕ ≃c A. From right to left: Let ϕ ∈ A and ϕ ≃ A. By
⪯c-counter-dominance, A? ϕ ⪯c ϕ. So A? ϕ ⪯c A by ⪯c-transitivity. Moreover,
A ⪯c A? ϕ by ⪯c-counter-dominance. Thus, A? ϕ ≃c A.
Proof (Proof for Observation 1:). It is easy to see that ∗c satisfies ∗c-closure and
∗c-relative success. We only check the remaining three postulates. We let B∨A
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denote the descriptor {Bϕ0 ∨⋯∨Bϕn} when A = {ϕ0,⋯, ϕn} ≠ ∅.
∗c-regularity: Let (K ∗c B) ∩ A ≠ ∅. It follows that A ≠ ∅ and XB
∨
A ≠ ∅. So
K ∗c A = XB
∨
A
< by the definition of ∗c. Thus, (K ∗c A) ∩A ≠ ∅.
∗c-confirmation: Let A ∩K ≠ ∅. Then A ≠ ∅ and K ∈ X
B
∨A. It follows from
(≦ 1) and (≦ 2) that K is the unique ≦-minimal element in XB
∨
A. Thus, K∗cA =
X
B
∨
A
< =K.
Reciprocity: Let (K ∗c A0) ∩ A1 ≠ ∅ and (K ∗c A1) ∩ A0 ≠ ∅. Let i ∈ {0,1}.
It follows that Ai ≠ ∅ and X
B
∨(Ai) ≠ ∅ and hence K ∗c Ai = X
B
∨(Ai)
< by the
definition of ∗c. So it follows from X
B
∨A0
< ∩ A1 ≠ ∅ and X
B
∨A1
< ∩ A0 ≠ ∅ that
X
B
∨A0
< ∈ X
B
∨A1 and XB
∨A1
< ∈ X
B
∨A0 and hence XB
∨A0
< ≦ X
B
∨A1
< ≦ X
B
∨A0
< by
(≦ 2). Since the minimal element in XB
∨(A0) is unique by (≦ 2), it follows that
X
B
∨
A0
< = X
B
∨
A1
< , i.e. K ∗c A0 =K ∗c A1.
Proof (Proof for Observation 2:). Let A ≡ B. Suppose A ∩ (K ∗c A) = ∅, then
A∩ (K ∗cB) = ∅ due to ∗c-regularity. Hence, B ∩ (K ∗cB) = ∅ by ∗c-closure. It
follows thatK∗cA =K∗cB =K by ∗c-relative success. Suppose A∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅,
then B ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-closure, so B ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-regularity, and
hence A ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-closure. It follows that K ∗c A = K ∗c B by
∗c-reciprocity. Thus, ∗c satisfies syntax irrelevance in any case.
Proof (Proof for Observation 3:). From left to right: Let A ⊆ B and (K∗cB)∩A ≠
∅. Then, A ≠ ∅ and hence (K ∗c A) ∩ A ≠ ∅ by ∗c-regularity. Since A ⊆ B, it
follows that (K ∗c A) ∩B ≠ ∅. Thus, K ∗c A =K ∗c B by ∗c-reciprocity.
From right to left: Let A ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅ and B ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅. It follows that
(A∪B)∩(K∗cB) ≠ ∅. By ∗c-regularity, it follows that (A∪B)∩(K∗c(A∪B)) ≠ ∅.
So A∩(K∗c(A∪B)) ≠ ∅ or B∩(K∗c(A∪B)) ≠ ∅. Without loss of generality, let
A∩(K ∗c (A∪B)) ≠ ∅, then K ∗cA =K ∗c (A∪B) by ∗c-cautiousness. It follows
that B ∩(K ∗c (A∪B)) = B ∩(K ∗cA) ≠ ∅ and hence K ∗cB =K ∗c (A∪B) by
∗c-cautiousness. So K ∗c A =K ∗c (A ∪B) =K ∗c B.
Proof (Proof for Observation 4:). Suppose (A ∪ B) ∩ (K ∗c (A ∪B)) = ∅, then
(A∪B) ∩ (K ∗cA) = (A∪B) ∩ (K ∗cB) = ∅ by ∗c-regularity. So A∩ (K ∗cA) =
B ∩ (K ∗c B) = ∅ and hence K ∗c (A ∪B) =K ∗c A =K ∗c B =K by ∗c-relative
success. Suppose (A ∪B) ∩ (K ∗c (A ∪B)) ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K ∗c (A ∪B)) ≠ ∅ or
B ∩(K ∗c (A∪B)) ≠ ∅. Let A∩(K ∗c (A∪B)) ≠ ∅, then A∩(K ∗cA) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-
regularity and hence (A∪B)∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅. It follows that K ∗c (A∪B) =K ∗cA
by ∗c-reciprocity. Similarly, we can show that K ∗c (A ∪ B) = K ∗c B holds in
the case of B ∩ (K ∗c (A ∪B)) ≠ ∅. Thus, ∗c satisfies ∗c-dichotomy in any case.
Proof (Proof for Observation 5:). From right to left: It follows immediately.
From left to right: Assume (⋆) that (K ∗cA1)∩A0 ≠ ∅, ⋯, (K ∗cAn)∩An−1 ≠ ∅
and (K ∗c A0) ∩An ≠ ∅ for some n ≥ 1. We prove that K ∗c A0 =K ∗c A1 = ⋯ =
K ∗c An by mathematical induction on n. For n = 1, this follows immediately
from ∗c-reciprocity. Let us hypothetically suppose that it holds for n = k (k ≥ 1),
then we should show that it also holds for n = k + 1.
Let A = ⋃0≤i≤k+1Ai. It follows from (⋆) that A ∩ (K ∗c Ai) ≠ ∅ for every 0 ≤ i ≤
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k+1. So A∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-regularity. It follows that there exists some j with
0 ≤ j ≤ k+1 such that Aj ∩(K ∗cA) ≠ ∅. Moreover, according to (⋆), if j = 0 then
Ak+1 ∩(K ∗cAj) ≠ ∅ else Aj−1 ∩(K ∗cAj) ≠ ∅. It follows that A∩(K ∗cAj) ≠ ∅
in any case. So K ∗c Aj =K ∗c A by ∗c-reciprocity. Hence, as A ∩ (K ∗c Ai) ≠ ∅
for every 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, it follows from (⋆) and ∗c-reciprocity that if 0 < j ≤ k + 1,
then K ∗c Aj = K ∗c A = K ∗c Aj−1 else K ∗c Aj = K ∗c A = K ∗c Ak+1. In each
case, the length of the loop is reduced to k. So, it follows from the hypothetical
supposition that K ∗c A0 = K ∗c A1 = ⋯ = K ∗c Ak+1. Thus, ∗c satisfies strong
reciprocity.
Proof (Proof for Theorem 1:). From construction to postulates: See Observation
1.
From postulates to construction: Let X = {K ∗cA ∣ A ⊆ L and A is finite}. Let ≦
′
be a relation on X defined as X ≦′ Y iff there exist elements A0, ⋯, An of L such
that X =K ∗cA0, Y =K ∗cAn and (K ∗cA1)∩A0 ≠ ∅, ⋯, (K ∗cAn)∩An−1 ≠ ∅.
We first show that ≦′ is a partial order:
Reflexivity: Let X = K ∗c A. If X = K, since K is belief set, X = K ∗c {⊺} by
∗c-confirmation. Moreover, by ∗c-closure, ⊺ ∈ K ∗c {⊺}. So X ≦
′ X . If X ≠ K,
then A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ by relative success. It follows immediately that X ≦
′ X .
Thus, X ≦′ X holds for every X ∈ X.
Transitivity: It follows immediately from the definition of ≦′.
Anti-symmetry: By Observation 5, ∗c satisfies ∗c-strong reciprocity. It follows
immediately from this and the definition of ≦′ that ≦′ is anti-symmetric.
So, given the axiom of choice, there exists a linear order ≦ such that ≦′⊆≦.12 We
will show that (X,≦) is the relational model we are looking for.
(X1): It is immediate from ∗c-closure.
(X2): It is immediate from that K ∗c ∅ ∈ X and ∗c satisfies ∗c-relative success.
(≦ 1): Since K is a belief set, K = K ∗c {⊺} by ∗c-confirmation. Moreover, by
∗c-closure, ⊺ ∈X for every X ∈ X. So K ≦
′ X for for every X ∈ X. Thus, as ≦′⊆≦,
K ≦X for every X ∈ X.
(≦ 2): Since L is finite, it is easy to see that the quotient of its power set under the
equivalence relation ≡ is finite. Moreover, by Observation 2, ∗c satisfies syntax-
irrelevance. It follows that X is finite. And as we have proved, ≦ is a linear order.
So ≦ is well-ordered and hence (≦ 2) holds.
In order to show that ∗c is based on (X,≦), we need to consider two cases:
(i) K ∗c A =K: In this case, we just need to prove that if A ≠ ∅ and X
B
∨A ≠ ∅,
then K ∈ XB
∨
A. It follows from A ≠ ∅ and XB
∨
A ≠ ∅ that there exists some B
such that A∩ (K ∗cB) ≠ ∅. So A∩ (K ∗cA) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-regularity. So, A∩K ≠ ∅
and hence K ∈ XB
∨A.
(ii) K ∗cA ≠K: In this case, we only need to show that X
B
∨A ≠ ∅ and K ∗cA =
X
B
∨A
< . Since K ∗c A ≠K, (K ∗c A) ∩A ≠ ∅ by ∗c-relative success. So X
B
∨A ≠ ∅
and K ∗c A ≦′ X for every X ∈ XB
∨
A. This means that K ∗c A ≦ X for every
X ∈B∨Φ(A) since ≦′⊆≦. Moreover, as we have shown, ≦ is a linear order. Thus,
12 See [15].
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K ∗c A = XB
∨
A
< .
To sum up (i) and (ii), ∗c is based on (X,≦).
Proof (Proof for Observation 6:). 1. Let A ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K ∗c A) = ∅. So, by
∗c-relative success, K ∗c A =K.
2. Let A∩(K∗cA) = ∅. Then, by ∗c-success, it follows that A = ∅. So, by vacuity,
K ∗c A =K.
3. Let A ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅, then A ≠ ∅. So, by ∗c-success, A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅.
Proof (Proof for Theorem 2:). From right to left: We only need to check success,
vacuity and consistency.
∗c-success: It follows immediately from (X3).
∗c-vacuity: It follows immediately from ⟨≦ to ○⟩ and ⟨○ to ∗c⟩.
∗c-consistency: It follows immediately from (≦ 3).
From left to right: Let (X,≦) be defined in the same way as the relational model
constructed in the proof of Theorem 1. By Observation 6, ∗c satisfies all postu-
lates listed in Theorem 1. So it is also true that (X,≦) constructed in this way is
indeed a relational model from which a choice revision ∗c can be derived. In order
to complete the proof, we only need to check that (X,≦) satisfies (X3) and (≦ 3):
Since ∗c satisfies ∗c-success and ∗c-closure, K ∗c {⊥} = Cn({⊥}) ∈ X, i.e. (X3)
holds of (X,≦). Moreover, since ∗c satisfies ∗c-consistency, K ∗c {ϕ} ≠ Cn({⊥})
for every ϕ /≡ ⊥. It follows that K ∗c {ϕ} = X
Bϕ
< < Cn({⊥}). So, (≦ 3) also holds
of (X,≦).
Proof (Proof for Observation 7:). 1. It follows from ⪯c-counter dominance that
A ∪B ⪯c A and A ∪B ⪯c B. Moreover, by ⪯c-union, A ⪯c A ∪B or B ⪯c A ∪B.
So A ⪯c B or B ⪯c A by ⪯c-transitivity.
2. From left to right: We first prove that ⪯c-coupling holds for all singletons, i.e.
if ϕ ≃c ψ, then ϕ ≃c ϕ ∧ ψ. Let ϕ ≃c ψ and A = {ϕ,ψ}. Since it is immediate
from ⪯c-counter dominance that ϕ ⪯c ϕ ∧ ψ, we only need to show ϕ ∧ ψ ⪯c ϕ.
By the first item of Lemma 1 and ⪯c-transitivity, A ≃c ϕ and A ≃c ψ. So, by
the second item of Lemma 1, A ≃c A ? ϕ and A ≃c A ? ψ. So, by ⪯c-weak
coupling, A ≃c A? (ϕ ∧ ψ). By ⪯c-counter dominance, ϕ ∧ψ ⪯c A? (ϕ ∧ ψ). So
ϕ ∧ψ ⪯c A? (ϕ ∧ ψ) ≃c A ≃c ϕ and hence ϕ ∧ψ ⪯c ϕ by ⪯c-transitivity.
Now we prove that ⪯c-coupling holds in general. Let A ≃c B. If A = ∅, it follows
immediately from ⪯c-counter-dominance that ∅ = A ≃c A?B = ∅. If B = ∅, it
follows from A ≃c B = ∅ that A ≃c A?B = ∅. If A ≠ ∅ and B ≠ ∅, then there
exist ϕ ∈ A and ψ ∈ B such that ϕ ≃c A and ψ ≃c B by the first item of Lemma 1.
So, by ⪯c-transitivity, ϕ ≃c ψ. So ϕ ≃c ϕ ∧ ψ as we have shown that ⪯c-coupling
holds for all singletons. Moreover, A?B ⪯c ϕ ∧ ψ by ⪯c-counter-dominance. So
A? B ⪯c ϕ ∧ ψ ≃c ϕ ≃c A and hence A ?B ⪯c A by ⪯c-transitivity. Moreover,
A ⪯c A?B by ⪯c-counter-dominance. Thus, A ≃c A?B.
From right to left: Let A ≃c A?B and A ≃c A?C. By ⪯c-transitivity, A?B ≃c
A ? C. So A ? B ≃c (A ? B) ? (A ? C) by ⪯c-coupling and hence A ≃c (A ?
B)? (A?C) by ⪯c-transitivity. In order to complete the proof, we only need to
show that (A?B)? (A?C) ≃c A? (B ?C). If A = ∅ or B = ∅ or C = ∅, then
∅ = (A? B) ? (A? C) ≃c A ? (B ? C) = ∅ by ⪯c-counter-dominance. If they
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are all non-empty, it also follows immediately from ⪯c-counter-dominance that
(A?B)? (A?C) ≃c A?B ?C.
Proof (Proof for Observation 8:). 1. From left to right: Let A ⪯c B. By the first
item of Lemma 1, there exists some ϕ in A such that ϕ ≃c A. Thus, ϕ ⪯c B by
⪯c-transitivity. From right to left: Suppose there exists some ϕ ∈ A such that
ϕ ⪯c B. By ⪯c-counter dominance, A ⪯c ϕ. Thus, A ⪯c B by ⪯c-transitivity.
2. From left to right: Let A ⪯c B. By ⪯c-counter dominance, B ⪯c ϕ for every
ϕ ∈ B. Thus, by ⪯c-transitivity, A ⪯c ϕ for all ϕ ∈ B. From right to left: Let
A ⪯c ϕ for all ϕ ∈ B. By the first item of Lemma 1, there exists some ψ in B
such that ψ ≃c B. So A ⪯c ψ ≃c B and hence A ⪯c B by ⪯c-transitivity.
Proof (Proof for Theorem 3:). 1. Let ⪯ be a quasi-linear believability relation
and ⪯c constructed from ⪯ through ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩. We first check that ⪯c is a standard
multiple believability relation.
⪯c-determination: It follows immediately from ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ that ∅ /⪯c A and A ⪯c ∅
for every non-empty A. Thus, ∅ ≺c A for every non-empty A.
⪯c-union: If A = ∅ and B = ∅, then it follows immediately from ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ that
⪯c-union holds for ⪯c. If A ≠ ∅ or B ≠ ∅, then A∪B ≠ ∅. Since both A and B are
finite and ⪯ satisfies ⪯-completeness, there exists some ϕ ∈ A∪B such that ϕ ⪯ λ
for every λ ∈ A ∪B. It follows that there exists some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯ λ for
every λ ∈ A ∪B or there exists some ϕ ∈ B such that ϕ ⪯ λ for every λ ∈ A ∪B.
So, by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩, A ⪯c A ∪B or B ⪯c A ∪B.
⪯c-transitivity: Let A ⪯c B and B ⪯c C. If C = ∅, then it follows immediately
from ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ that A ⪯c C. If C ≠ ∅, then A ≠ ∅ and B ≠ ∅ since A ⪯c B, B ⪯c C
and ⪯c satisfies ⪯c-determination as we have shown. So, by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩, there exists
some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯ ψ for every ψ ∈ B and there exists some ψ ∈ B such
that ψ ⪯ λ for every λ ∈ C. So, by ⪯-transitivity, there exists some ϕ ∈ A such
that ϕ ⪯ λ for every λ ∈ C. Thus, A ⪯c C by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩.
⪯c-counter-dominance: Assume (⋆) that for every ϕ ∈ B, there exists some ψ ∈ A
such that ϕ ⊢ ψ. If B = ∅, then it follows directly from ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ that A ⪯c B. If
B ≠ ∅, since B is finite and ⪯ satisfies ⪯-completeness, there exists some ϕ ∈ B
such that ϕ ⪯ λ for every λ ∈ B. Moreover, by (⋆), there exists some ψ ∈ A such
that ϕ ⊢ ψ, and hence ψ ⪯ ϕ by ⪯-counter dominance. So, by ⪯-transitivity, ψ ⪯ λ
for every λ ∈ B. Thus, A ⪯c B by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩.
⪯c-coupling: Let A ≃c B. If A = ∅, then it follows directly from ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ that
A ≃c A ? B. If B = ∅, then it follows immediately from A ≃c B = ∅ that
A ≃c A?B = ∅. If A ≠ ∅ and B ≠ ∅, since ⪯c satisfies ⪯c-union, ⪯c-transitivity
and ⪯c-counter dominance as we have shown, by the first item of Lemma 1,
there exist ϕ ∈ A and ψ ∈ B such that ϕ ≃c A and ψ ≃c B. So, by ⪯c-transitivity,
ϕ ≃c ψ and hence ϕ ≃ ψ by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩. It follows that ϕ ≃ ϕ∧ψ by ⪯-coupling. So
ϕ ≃c ϕ∧ψ by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩. Moreover, A?B ⪯c ϕ∧ψ by ⪯c-counter dominance. So,
A?B ⪯c ϕ∧ψ ≃c ϕ ≃c A and hence A?B ⪯c A by ⪯c-transitivity. It is immediate
from ⪯c-counter dominance that A ⪯c A?B. Thus, A ≃c A?B.
⪯c-minimality: From left to right: Suppose A ⪯c B for all B. It follows that
A ⪯c ⊺. So there exists some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯ ⊺ by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩. So ϕ ⪯ ψ for all
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ψ by ⪯-counter dominance and ⪯-transitivity. So, by ⪯-minimality, ϕ ∈K. Thus,
A ∩K ≠ ∅. From right to left: Let A ∩K ≠ ∅, i.e. there exists some ϕ ∈ A ∩K.
Since ϕ ∈K, ϕ ⪯ ψ for all ψ by ⪯-minimality. So A ⪯c B for all B by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩.
⪯c-maximality: Let A be non-empty and B ⪯c A for all non-empty B. Then,
⊥⪯c A and hence by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ ⊥ ⪯ ϕ for every ϕ ∈ A. So, due to ⪯-counter dom-
inance and ⪯-transitivity, for every ϕ ∈ A, ψ ⪯ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L. Hence, for every
ϕ ∈ A, ϕ ⊣⊩ ⊥ due to ⪯-maximality. Thus, A ≡ {⊥}.
Let ⪯′ be the believability relation derived from ⪯c through ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩. It is easy
to see that ϕ ⪯ ψ if and only if ϕ ⪯c ψ if and only if ϕ ⪯′ ψ. Thus, ⪯ can be
retrieved from ⪯c through ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩.
2. It is easy to see that ⪯ satisfies ⪯-transitivity, ⪯-counter dominance, ⪯-coupling
and ⪯-completeness. In what follows we only check ⪯-minimality and ⪯-maximality.
Minimality: From left to right: Let ϕ ∈ K. Then, ϕ ⪯c ψ for all ψ due to ⪯c-
minimality. Thus, ϕ ⪯ ψ for all ψ by ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩. From right to left: Let ϕ ⪯ ψ for
all ψ. Then ϕ ⪯c ψ for all ψ by ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩. So, by the second item of Observation
8, ϕ ⪯c B for all non-empty B. Moreover, due to ⪯c-counter-dominance, ϕ ⪯c ∅.
Thus, by ⪯c-minimality, ϕ ∈K.
Maximality: Let ψ ⪯ ϕ for all ψ. Then ψ ⪯c ϕ for all ψ by ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩. So, by the
first item of Observation 8, B ⪯c ϕ for all non-empty B. So, due to ⪯c- maximal-
ity, ϕ ⊣⊩ ⊥.
In order to prove that ⪯c can be retrieved from ⪯ through ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩, let ⪯′c be the
multi-believability relation derived from ⪯ through ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩. We need to show
that A ⪯c B if and only if A ⪯
′
c B.
From left to right: Let A ⪯c B. If B = ∅, it follows directly from ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ that
A ⪯′c B. If A = ∅, then B = ∅ by ⪯c-determination. It also follows immediately
from ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩ that A ⪯
′
c B. If A ≠ ∅ and B ≠ ∅, then, by Observation 8, there
exists some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯c ψ for all ψ ∈ B. So, by ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩, there exists
some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯ ψ for all ψ ∈ B. Hence, by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩, A ⪯
′
c B.
From right to left: Let A ⪯′c B. If B = ∅, then it follows directly from ⪯c-counter
dominance that A ⪯c B. If B ≠ ∅, then there exists some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯ ψ
for all ψ ∈ B by ⟨⪯ to ⪯c⟩. So there exists some ϕ ∈ A such that ϕ ⪯c ψ for all
ψ ∈ B by ⟨⪯c to ⪯⟩. Hence, by Observation 8, A ⪯c B.
Proof (Proof for Theorem 4:). From construction to postulates: ∗c-closure: We
need to prove that K ∗c A is a belief set for every A. If ∅ ⪯c A, it follows from
⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩ that K ∗cA =K. So K ∗cA is belief set since K is belief set. If ∅ /⪯c A,
then A ≺c ∅ by ⪯c-counter dominance and hence K ∗c A = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A ? ϕ}
by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. Moreover, it follows from ∅ /⪯c A and ⪯c-counter dominance that
A ≠ ∅. So, by Lemma 1, K ∗c A = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A ? ϕ} ≠ ∅. Let ϕ ∈ K ∗c A,
ψ ∈K ∗c A and ϕ ∧ ψ ⊢ λ, in order to complete the proof, we need to show that
λ ∈K ∗cA. By ⪯c-weak coupling, it follows from A ≃c A?ϕ and A ≃c A?ψ that
A ≃c A?ϕ ∧ψ. By ⪯c-counter dominance and ϕ∧ψ ⊢ λ, A?λ ⪯c A?ϕ∧ψ. So
A? λ ⪯c A by ⪯c-transitivity. Moreover, A ⪯c A? λ by ⪯c-counter dominance.
Thus, A ≃c A? λ, i.e. λ ∈K ∗c A.
∗c-relative success: Let K ∗c A ≠ K. Then, by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩, A ≺c ∅. So, by ⪯c-
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counter dominance, A ≠ ∅ and hence, by Lemma 1, there exists some ϕ ∈ A such
that A ≃c A?ϕ. Moreover, by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩, K∗cA = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A?ϕ} when A ≺c ∅.
Thus, A ∩K ∗c A ≠ ∅.
⪯c-confirmation: Let A ∩ K ≠ ∅, i.e. there exists some ψ ∈ A ∩ K. Suppose
A /≺c ∅, then it follows immediately from ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩ that K ∗c A = K. Suppose
A ≺ ∅, then, by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩, we only need to show that K = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A ? ϕ}.
From left to right inclusion direction: Let λ ∈ K. By ⪯c-counter dominance,
A ? λ ⪯c λ ∧ ψ. Since K is a belief set, it follows from λ ∈ K and ψ ∈ K that
λ ∧ψ ∈K. Hence, λ ∧ψ ⪯c A by ⪯c-minimality. So A?λ ⪯c A by ⪯c-transitivity.
Moreover, A ⪯c A? λ by ⪯c-counter dominance. So, λ ∈ {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ}. From
right to left inclusion direction: Let λ ∈ {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ}. By ⪯c-counter dom-
inance, λ ⪯c A ? λ and A ⪯c ψ. So, λ ⪯c A ? λ ≃c A ⪯c ψ and hence λ ⪯c ψ
by ⪯c-transitivity. Since ψ ∈ K, ψ ⪯c B for all B by ⪯c-minimality. So, by ⪯c-
transitivity, λ ⪯c B for all B and hence λ ∈ K by ⪯c-minimality. To sum up (i)
and (ii), K = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ} =K ∗c A when A ≺c ∅.
∗c-regularity: Let A∩(K∗cB) ≠ ∅. (i) LetK∗cB =K, then A∩K = A∩(K∗cB) ≠
∅. As we have shown that ∗c-confirmation holds of ∗c, it follows that K∗cA =K.
So A∩(K ∗cA) = A∩K = A∩(K ∗cB) ≠ ∅. (ii) Let K ∗cB ≠K, then B ≺c ∅ and
K ∗c B = {ϕ ∣ B ≃c B ? ϕ} by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. It follows from A ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅ and
K ∗c B = {ϕ ∣ B ≃c B ? ϕ} that there exists some ψ ∈ A such that B ≃c B ? ψ.
By ⪯c-counter dominance, A ⪯c ψ and ψ ⪯c B?ψ. So, A ⪯c ψ ⪯c B?ψ ≃c B and
hence A ⪯c B by ⪯c-transitivity. Moreover, it follows from B ≺c ∅ that ∅ /⪯c B.
So, by ⪯c-transitivity, ∅ /⪯c A. By ⪯c-counter dominance, A ⪯c ∅. So, A ≺c ∅ and
hence A = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ} by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. Also, A ≠ ∅ since A ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅.
So, by Lemma 1, A ∩ (K ∗c A) = A ∩ {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ} ≠ ∅. To sum up (i) and
(ii), ∗c-regularity holds of ∗c.
∗c-reciprocity: Let A∩(K ∗cB) ≠ ∅ and B ∩(K ∗cA) ≠ ∅. (i) Let K ∗cA =K or
K∗cB =K, then it follows immediately fromA∩(K∗cB) ≠ ∅ and B∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅
that K ∗c A = K ∗c B = K by ∗c-confirmation, which has been proved. Suppose
K ∗c A ≠ K and K ∗c B ≠K, then K ∗c A = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ} and K ∗c B = {ϕ ∣
B ≃c B ? ϕ} by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. Next we show that K ∗c A ⊆ K ∗c B. (The converse
direction can be proved in the same way.) Let ϕ ∈ K ∗c A = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ}.
As it is immediate from ⪯c-counter dominance that B ⪯c B ? ϕ, we only need
to show that B ? ϕ ⪯c B. Since B ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅, there exists some ψ ∈ B
such that A ≃c A?ψ. By the second item of Observation 7, ⪯c satisfies ⪯c-weak
coupling, so A ≃c A?ϕ∧ψ. Due to ⪯c-counter dominance, ϕ∧ψ ⪯c A? (ϕ∧ψ).
So ϕ∧ψ ⪯c A by ⪯c-transitivity. Furthermore, since A∩(K∗cB) ≠ ∅, there exists
some λ ∈ A such that B ≃c B ? λ. By ⪯c-counter dominance, A ⪯c λ ⪯c B ? λ.
So ϕ ∧ ψ ⪯c B by ⪯c-transitivity. Moreover, due to ψ ∈ B, B ? ϕ ⪯c ϕ ∧ ψ by
⪯c-counter dominance. So, by ⪯c-transitivity, B?ϕ ⪯c B. To sum up (i) and (ii),
∗c-reciprocity holds of ∗c.
From postulates to construction: Let ∗c be a choice revision operation satis-
fying (∗c1) through (∗c5). Let ⪯c be a relation derived from ∗c in the following
way:
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⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ A ⪯c B iff either (i) B ∩ (K ∗c B) = ∅ or (ii) A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅
and there exists A0,⋯,An such that K ∗c A = K ∗c A0, K ∗c B = K ∗c An
and A0 ∩ (K ∗c A1) ≠ ∅,⋯,An−1 ∩ (K ∗c An) ≠ ∅.
Let us first prove the following proposition:
(⋆) Let ∗c be a operation satisfying basic postulates on choice revision and ⪯c
constructed from ∗c in the way of ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩, then K ∗cA =K ∗cB whenever
A ≃c B.
Proof for Proposition (⋆): Let A ≃c B. There are two cases. (i) B ∩ (K ∗c B) =
∅. Then it follows from B ⪯c A and ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that A ∩ (K ∗c A) = ∅. So
K ∗c A = K ∗c B = K by ∗c-relative success. (ii) B ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅. Then it
follows from A ⪯c B and ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ and there exist
A0,⋯,An such that K ∗c A = K ∗c A0, K ∗c B = K ∗c An and A0 ∩ (K ∗c A1) ≠
∅,⋯,An−1 ∩ (K ∗c An) ≠ ∅. Since A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅, it follows from B ⪯c A
and ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that there exist B0,⋯,Bm such that K ∗c B =K ∗c B0, K ∗c A =
K ∗c Bm and B0 ∩ (K ∗c B1) ≠ ∅,⋯,Bm−1 ∩ (K ∗c Bm) ≠ ∅. So, it holds that
A ∩ (K ∗c A0) ≠ ∅, A0 ∩ (K ∗c A1) ≠ ∅,⋯,An−1 ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅, B ∩ (K ∗c B0) ≠
∅, B0∩(K∗cB1) ≠ ∅,⋯, and Bm−1∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅. By Observation 5, ∗c satisfies
∗c-strong reciprocity. So it follows that K ∗c A =K ∗c B.
Now we turn back to check the properties of the derived ⪯c.
⪯c-transitivity: Let A ⪯c B and B ⪯c C. There are two cases. (i) C∩(K∗cC) = ∅.
Then, it follows immediately from ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that A ⪯c C. (ii) C ∩(K ∗cC) ≠ ∅.
Then it follows from B ⪯c C and ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that B∩(K ∗cB) ≠ ∅ and there exist
B0,⋯,Bn such that K ∗c B = K ∗c B0, K ∗c C = K ∗c Bn and B0 ∩ (K ∗c B1) ≠
∅,⋯,Bn−1 ∩ (K ∗c Bn) ≠ ∅. Since B ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅, it follows from A ⪯c B and
⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ and there exist A0,⋯,Am such that K ∗c A =
K ∗c A0, K ∗c B = K ∗c Am and A0 ∩ (K ∗c A1) ≠ ∅,⋯,Am−1 ∩ (K ∗c Am) ≠ ∅.
So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩, A ⪯c C.
⪯c-coupling: Let A ≃c B. There are three cases. (i) A ∩ (K ∗c A) = ∅. Then,
(A?B)∩(K∗c(A?B)) = ∅. Otherwise, it follows from (A?B)∩(K∗c(A?B)) ≠
∅ that A ∩ (K ∗c (A ? B)) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-closure, and hence A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅
by ∗c-regularity, which contradicts that A ∩ (K ∗c A) = ∅. So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩,
A ≃c A?B. (ii) B ∩ (K ∗c B) = ∅. Then, it follows from B ⪯c A and ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩
that A∩(K ∗cA) = ∅. So, this case is reducible to (i). (iii) A∩(K ∗cA) ≠ ∅ and
B∩(K∗cB) ≠ ∅. By Proposition (⋆), it follows from A ≃c B thatK∗cA =K∗cB.
So B∩(K∗cA) = B∩(K∗cB) ≠ ∅. It follows from A∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅ and B∩(K∗c
A) ≠ ∅ that (A?B)∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-closure. So, (A?B)∩(K∗c(A?B)) ≠ ∅
by ∗c-regularity, and hence A∩(K∗c(A?B)) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-closure. So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩,
A ≃c A?B.
⪯c-counter dominance: Let A and B satisfy (†): for every ϕ ∈ B there exists
ψ ∈ A such that ϕ ⊢ ψ. Suppose B ∩ (K ∗c B) = ∅, then it follows directly from
⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that A ⪯c B. Suppose B ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅, then A ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅ by †
and ∗c-closure. Furthermore, A∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-regularity. So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩,
A ⪯c B.
⪯c-minimality: From left to right: Let A ⪯c B for all B. Then, A ⪯c ⊺. Since
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⊺ ∈K∗c⊺ by ∗c-closure, it follows from A ⪯c ⊺ and ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ that A∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅
and there exist A0,⋯,An such that K ∗c A = K ∗c A0, K ∗c ⊺ = K ∗c An and
A0∩(K ∗cA1) ≠ ∅,⋯,An−1∩(K ∗cAn) ≠ ∅. Moreover, by ∗c-closure, ⊺ ∈K ∗cA0.
By Observation 5, ∗c-strong reciprocity holds of ∗c, so K ∗cA =K ∗c ⊺. As K is a
belief set, by ∗c-confirmation,K∗c⊺ =K. So, A∩K = A∩(K∗c⊺) = A∩(K∗cA) ≠
∅. From right to left: Let A ∩K ≠ ∅. Then K ∗c A = K by ∗c-confirmation. So
A∩ (K ∗c A) = A∩K ≠ ∅. Moreover, since K is a belief set, by ∗c-confirmation,
K ∗c ⊺ =K =K ∗cA. By ∗c-closure, ⊺ ∈K ∗cB for all B. So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩, A ⪯c B
for all B.
⪯c-union: Suppose (A∪B)∩(K∗c(A∪B)) = ∅, then ⪯c-union follows immediately
from ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩. Suppose (A∪B)∩(K∗c(A∪B)) ≠ ∅, then A∩(K∗c(A∪B)) ≠ ∅
or B ∩(K ∗c (A∪B)) ≠ ∅. Let A∩(K ∗c (A∪B)) ≠ ∅, then A∩(K ∗cA) ≠ ∅ by
∗c-regularity. So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩, A ⪯c A ∪B. Similarly, B ⪯c A ∪B follows from
B ∩ (K ∗c (A ∪B)) ≠ ∅. So, it holds that A ⪯c A ∪B or B ⪯c A ∪B.
Finally, we show that ∗c can be retrieved from ⪯c through ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. Let ∗
′
c be
the operation constructed from ⪯c by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. We will show that ∗c = ∗
′
c.
Suppose A ≺ ∅, then A∩(K∗cA) ≠ ∅ by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩ andK∗cA′ = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A?ϕ}
by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. (i) Let ϕ ∈K ∗c A, then (A? ϕ) ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-closure. So
(A?ϕ)∩(K∗c (A?ϕ)) ≠ ∅ by ∗c-regularity, and hence A∩(K∗c (A?ϕ)) ≠ ∅ by
∗c-closure. So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩, A ≃c A?ϕ, i.e. ϕ ∈K ∗
′
cA. (ii) Let ϕ ∈K ∗
′
cA, then
A ≃c A?ϕ. It follows from this and A ≺c ∅ that A?ϕ ≺c ∅ by ⪯-transitivity. So,
by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩, (A? ϕ) ∩ (K ∗c (A? ϕ)) ≠ ∅. It follows that ϕ ∈ (K ∗c (A? ϕ))
by ∗c-closure. Moreover, by Proposition (⋆), it follows from A ≃c A ? ϕ that
K ∗cA =K ∗c (A?ϕ). So, ϕ ∈K ∗c A. To sum up (i) and (ii), K ∗c A =K ∗
′
c A.
Suppose A /≺c ∅, then K ∗′c A = K by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩. Moreover, due to ⪯c-counter
dominance, it follows from A /≺c ∅ that A ≃c ∅. So, by Proposition (⋆), K ∗c
A = K ∗c ∅. Since ∅ ∩ (K ∗c ∅) = ∅, K ∗c ∅ = K by ∗c-relative success. So,
K ∗c A =K ∗c ∅ =K =K ∗
′
c A.
Thus, K ∗c A =K ∗
′
c A for all A.
Proof (Proof for Theorem 5:). From construction to postulates: As we have
proved Theorem 4, here we only check ∗c-vacuity, ∗c-success and ∗c-consistency.
∗c-vacuity: It is immediate from Observation 6.
∗c-success: Let A ≠ ∅. By ⪯c-determination, A ≺c ∅. So, by ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩, K ∗c A =
{ϕ ∣ A ≃c A? ϕ}. Hence, by Lemma 1, A ∩ (K ∗c A) ≠ ∅.
∗c-consistency: Let A /≡ {⊥}. There are two cases. (i) A = ∅. Then K ∗c A = K
by ∗c-vacuity which has been shown holding of ∗c. That K ∗c A is consistent
follows immediately from our assumption that K is consistent. (ii) A ≠ ∅. Then
A ≺c ∅ by ⪯c-determination. So, K ∗c A = {ϕ ∣ A ≃c A ? ϕ}. Suppose towards
contradiction that K ∗c A ⊢ ⊥. It follows from K ∗c A ⊢ ⊥ and ∗c-closure that
A ≃c A? ⊥. So, by ⪯c counter dominance and ⪯c-transitivity, ⊥ ⪯c A and hence
B ⪯c A for all non-empty B. So, by ⪯c-maximality, it follows that A ≡ {⊥}, which
contradicts A /≡ {⊥}. Thus, ∗c-consistency holds of ∗c.
2. From postulates to construction: Let ⪯c be derived from ∗c in the way of
⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩. Given Theorem 4, in order to show that ⪯c is a standard multiple be-
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lievability relation, we only need to check ⪯c-maximality and ∗c-determination.
⪯c-maximality: Let B ≠ ∅ and A ⪯c B for all non-empty A. Then, {⊥} ⪯c B.
Moreover, by ∗c-success, B ∩ (K ∗c B) ≠ ∅ and ⊥ ∈ K ∗c {⊥}. So, by ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩,
there exist A0,⋯,An such that K ∗c {⊥} = K ∗c A0, K ∗c B = K ∗c An and
A0∩(K∗cA1) ≠ ∅,⋯,An−1∩(K∗cAn) ≠ ∅. By ∗c-success and closure,K∗c{⊥} =
L, so B∩K∗c{⊥} ≠ ∅. It follows that K∗cB =K∗c{⊥} since ∗c satisfies ∗c-strong
reciprocity according to Observation 5. So, K ∗cB ⊢ ⊥. Hence, by ∗c-consistency,
B ≡ {⊥}.
⪯c-determination: LetA ≠ ∅. It follows immediately from ∗c-success and ⟨∗c to ⪯c⟩
that ∅ /⪯c A. Moreover, A ⪯c ∅ by ⪯c-counter dominance. So A ≺c ∅.
Furthermore, by the same argument that was presented in the proof of Theorem
4, it follows that ∗c can be retrieved from ⪯c through ⟨⪯c to ∗c⟩.
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